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The studies in the multi-agents system (MAS) have attracted many researchers from
various fields. The focal point of investigation in MAS has not only surrounded on
the development of the control algorithms, but nowadays covers on the practically
to use MAS as one of the problem solvers in the other fields of studies.
This dissertation is concerned on solving the Stable Marriage Problem (SMP).
The SMP is a combinatorial optimization problem of finding the stable one-to-one
pairing between the bipartite sets. The simplest example to illustrate the bipartite
sets is to consider the groups of men and women. Each individual in both groups
has their own sets of preference lists. In these lists, they contain the information of
the preferred partners ranked in the orderly manner. The main objective in solving
SMP is to attain pairs between these two sets, such that there exists no blocking
pairs. Hence, if this is achieved then the matching is called a stable matching.
David Gale and Llyod Shapley were the first to introduce the SMP theory in
year 1962. They proposed sequential algorithm (namely, G-S algorithm) to attain
matching between the two sets. But, the results indicted that the optimal matching
favors more to the proposers than the receivers. Furthermore, since the proposed
algorithm partially utilized the information from preference lists, hence opens for
possibility that there exists other methods which yields to better matching.
In this dissertation, we proposed a new method of finding matching between
the bipartite sets by the means of MAS. By assigning each agent to represent the
individuals in the sets (i.e., to denote agents as man and woman), we designed the
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suitable control laws to steer the motions of the agents such that their final positions
correspond to the final matching.
To achieve this objective, we utilized the same preference lists as used in G-S
algorithm to find matching. We introduced a global Lyapunov function that make
use of all the available information. There were two control laws proposed in this
dissertation. The first control law considered full communication topology between
all agents. However, there was drawback such that the amplitude of the calculated
control signals became large. To overcome this phenomenon, we proposed the sec-
ond control law, where it is almost identical to the previous one. Here, the com-
munication between agents were now limited to exist only among their neighbors.
Consequently, the amplitude of the calculated control signals were reduced.
By executing the proposed control laws, the final trajectories and positions of
the agents gave us the information on the agents’ final pairs. It was also found that
the steering motions of the agents corresponded to the minimization of the global
Lyapunov function. The total system of MAS is Lyapunov stable, but the final
matching still indicated the existence of the blocking pairs.
In conclusion, the proposed control algorithms can guarantee that each of the
agents to be matched with his or her stable partners. It was also observed that this
matching yielded to the total system to be Lyapunov stable, despite the existence of
some blocking pairs.
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1.1 Motivation and objectives
The multi-agents system (MAS) is composed of multiple interacting intelligent
agents that share information among them to accomplish a certain task. Substan-
tial platforms of researches related to MAS can be found in many areas[1]. Well-
established and on-going discussion topics related to MAS vary from formation
control (i.e., leader-follower[2]), consensus[3] , and pursuit[4] ) to wireless sensor
network[5], and system tracking[6].
On the other hand, the stable marriage problem (SMP) is one of the combinato-
rial optimization problems. Given the groups of men and women, where each of the
individuals has their own sets of preference lists, such that they rank orderly their
preferred partners. With this information, the aim of solving the matching problem
is to establish a stable partnership between these two sets without the blocking pairs.
The terminology of SMP was first coined in year 1962 by David Gale and Lyod
Shapley in their seminal work of [7]. They introduced a sequential algorithm (as
from now on we refer it as G-S algorithm) to establish matching between bipartite
sets, in consideration of matching students with their appropriate colleges, or in the
marriage situation per se. The algorithm works by one side of the divides to make
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the proposal, while the other evaluates either to accept or reject the said proposal.
The proposing iteration continues as long as there exists proposer which has yet to
be matched with his/her stable partners.
The G-S algorithm works flawlessly to attain stable matching between these
two sets without the blocking pairs. However, it only uses partial information from
the preference lists where the matching iteration stop once all the proposers found
their matches. Therefore, there are possibilities that other probable matching might
yield to better matching results suppose full information in the preference lists is
used. Moreover, the G-S algorithm favors proposer than the receiver. Hence, the
attained final matching will be optimal to the men (if they are the proposer) over
the women. This phenomenon is commonly known as the men-optimal, women-
pessimal situation.
The way this algorithm works in sequential manner limits the usage of all the
information available in the preference lists. Therefore, in this dissertation we aim
to emulate the strategies given by the G-S algorithm, but to introduce dynamical
approach in attaining stable matching between the bipartite sets. In the following,
we state the main objectives which motivate us in our investigation of the stable
marriage problem.
The objectives of this work are as follows:
• To investigate the potential of treating a discrete optimization problem through
solving the sets of di↵erential equations in the multi-agents formulation.
• To identify and formulate suitable cost function that best interpret the prefer-
ence lists of both men and women.
• To attain dynamically stable matching between men and women.
2
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1.2 Surveys on past and related researches
The studies on SMP have attracted many researchers in various fields particularly
in discrete mathematics and economics. One of the famous examples which thor-
oughly utilizes the matching theory is the National Resident Matching Program
(NRMP) of the United States, that focus on assigning the medical school students
to their appropriate residency program[8, 9]. Apart from NRMP, the SMP theory
has also been applied in computer science[10] and engineering[11, 12].
Vast approaches in finding optimal matching in the case of SMP can be found in
the literature. As the matching theory was first introduced by Gale & Shapley[7], it
was observed that the pattern in the earlier works of SMP revolved around the key
concepts of utilizing the discrete or sequential algorithms such as in [13, 14, 15, 16].
In the later years, more optimization techniques came into existence. In [17], a
linear programming technique was proposed to find the stable matching. Further,
the applications of linear programming was extended to the case of weighted graph
matching problem[18], and as part of a dual ascent algorithm[19].
Another approach of solving SMP is by utilizing the biologicaly-inspired so-
lutions. In Nakamura et al.[20], they proposed the Genetic Algorithm(GA) in the
sex-fair matching. They treated the SMP as the graph problems for e↵ective ap-
plication of GA. In addition, Vien & Chung [21] also adopted GA. In contrast to
[20], they proposed the conversion of the preference list into multi-objective fitness
function, and then sought the optimal solution by GA. In [22], the authors consid-
ered the multi-attribute bilateral matching problem and employed the Ant Colony
algorithm to seek the optimal matching.
The SMP has also been investigated through graphical elucidation. In [23],
a network visualization of stable matching in SMP has been presented. The au-
thors introduced the network consisting of nodes which represents matching, and
achieved stability by exchanging a partner between two pairs. In the extended
work[24], the authors proposed the case of SMP represented by the multi-edges
3
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bipartite graph. In this approach, the classification of all matching instances could
be identified by a diagram that contains several constraints.
In this dissertation, we aim to investigate the potential of attaining stable match-
ing between the bipartite sets of men and women by dynamical approach. In similar
fashion to our main objective, Hata & Ishida[25] proposed the prey-predator strat-
egy based on the Lotka-Volterra model to dynamically attain stable matching. A
set of di↵erential equations representing the potential pairs in the matching were
formulated from the preference lists. In contrast to [25], our proposal focus on de-
signing the suitable control action to each of the agents that represents the individual
in both men and women sets. The proposed control laws are derived based on the
Lyapunov function minimization formulated from the preference lists. By steering
the agents’ motions to the intended common position, we dynamically attain stable
matching.
1.3 Applications overview
The implementation of the matching theory can be found in the broad spectrum of
applications ranging from economics to engineering. To mention a few works in
economics, in [26, 27], the dynamics of the two-sided matching has been investi-
gated. Meanwhile in [28], Chen & Song studied the matching between banks and
firms in the loan market.
Other promising practical applications of SMP are also emerging in the engi-
neering. Nitin & Verma [11] presented evidences that SMP is identical to the prob-
lem of Stable Configurations of Multi-Stage Interconnections Network (MINs), and
proposed e cient algorithms to solve the dynamic MINs stability problem in [12].
In [29], Leshem et al.proposed the use of SMP theory in allocating spectrum of cog-
nitive radio systems. On the other hand, Xu & Li[30] treated the virtual machine
(VM) migration problem in cloud computing and proposed the egalitarian approach
4
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to find a stable matching fair between VM and servers.
To add further to the list, the SMP has also been implemented to suit the applica-
tions in robotics and image processing. In [31], the distributed SMP was formulated
on the battery charging planning of autonomous mobile robots. They assumed that
there exists n autonomous mobile robots and n charger stations, and the planning
was needed to avoid starvation of robots. Next, in [32] the SMP algorithms was
proposed for image processing. The author introduced the BZ algorithm to achieve
e cient trade-o↵ between the global satisfaction, the fairness and stability. BZ was
formulated based on the G-S algorithm in which it scans the marriage table cells to
maximize stability and global satisfaction concurrently.
1.4 Main contributions of the dissertation
In this dissertation, we present the approach of attaining stable matching in the
multi-agents framework. The dominant aim of this work is to formulate suitable
Lyapunov function based on the given preference lists in order to attain stable
matching. We claim the following as the contributions derived from our work:
• We introduce the alternative definition of stable matching as given in Defi-
nition 3.3.1 as to complement the existing definition of stability in matching
theory.
• We propose Theorems 4.1.1 and 5.2.1 to present the suitable control laws exe-
cuted by each agent, such that the dynamical stable matching can be attained.
• The stability of the matching can be analyzed by investigating the stability of
the total system utilizing the Lyapunov stability theory.
1.5 Organization of the dissertation
The narrative of chapters for the rest of dissertation are as follows:
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In Chapter 2, we provide the mathematical notations related to our work. We
also discuss the definition of stability commonly used in a dynamic system and the
definition of stability used in the matching theory.
Next in Chapter 3 , we revisit the G-S algorithm before introducing our problem
setting in attaining stable matching by the means of MAS.
Chapters 4 and 5 contains our main results. Here, we formulate the control
laws for two di↵erent conditions. The stability of the total system formed by the
proposed control algorithms are also analyzed.
Then, in Chapter 5, the e↵ectiveness of the proposed methods are illustrated by
numerical example.




In this chapter, we provide the preliminaries of some mathematical notions and
definitions which are crucial in our work. In Section 2.1 we address some basic
notations. In Section 2.2, the basic structure related to the graph theory is pre-
sented. Then, in Section 2.3 we restate the fundamental definitions related to SMP
from [33]. Finally in Section 2.4, the definitions of stability for both Lyapunov and
matching theories are discussed.
2.1 Basic notations
The sets of real numbers and vectors with m-dimension are denoted as R and Rm,
respectively. We say that the vector AT and the matrix BT as the transpose of
A 2 Rn and B 2 Rn⇥n. If B 2 Rn⇥n is non-singular, then its inverse is denoted as B 1.
Let 1 = [1, . . . , 1]T be the vector with all elements of 1. The identity matrix with
n ⇥ n dimension is denoted as In 2 Rn⇥n. For A = (ai j) 2 Rn⇥m and B 2 Rl⇥k, we
denote the Kronecker product A ⌦ B 2 Rnl⇥mk as
A ⌦ B =
26666666666666666664




an1B . . . anmB
37777777777777777775 . (2.1)
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For a given Euclidean norm function, we treat the following lemma as to provide
conditions relaxation when we encounter a discontinuous point x = 0.
Lemma 2.1.1. Given the Euclidean norm h(x) := kx(t)k with x 2 Rn, its derivative
with respect to t is
d
dt
kxk = (@h(x))T dx
dt
(2.2)




kxk if x , 0
{g | kgk  1} if x = 0.
(2.3)
Proof. First, consider the part when x , 0. By defining s(x) := r2 = kxk2 = xT x
and di↵erentiating it by t, we have dsdt = 2x
T x˙. Then, the time derivative of kxk is





















which is valid 8x , 0. Next, we consider the part when x = 0. Since h(x) is non-
smooth at x = 0, then we define a subgradient g which is any element of [ 1, 1] to
ensure the continuity of the @h(x), that is
d
dt
kxk = gT x˙.
⇤
Assumption 2.1.1. The Euclidean norm h(x) defined in Lemma 2.1.1 is a C0 func-
tion and is not di↵erentiable at point x = 0. By introducing the subdi↵erential (2.3)
with subgradients x/kxk and g, we assume this function becomes smooth at x = 0.
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2.2 Graph theory
A graph G of N agents is built upon a finite set called the vertex set represented
by I = {1, 2, . . . ,N}, and the corresponding positions X = {x1, . . . , xN}, with the
edge set of E. We said xi, x j 2 E if there is a communication link between them.
We define the neighborhood set of agent i as Ni =
n
x j | xi, x j 2 E,8 j
o
. In some
occasions, if the sensing range R between the agents is specified, then we define the
neighborhood set as in Def. 2.2.1
Definition 2.2.1 (Neighbouring Agents). Let R be the distance sensing range of
agent i. Agent j is a neighbor of i if j belongs to Ni where
Ni =
n
j 2 I | ri j = kx j   xik  R
o
(2.4)
is the neighboring set of each i.
The cardinality of agent xi is denoted as |xi| where cardinality is the number of
edges connecting xi to its neighbors. The graphG is an undirected graph if 8xi 2 X,
there is no arc connecting from xi to x j 2 Ni. In contrary, the graph G is said to be
a directed graph if such arc exist. The examples of undirected and directed graph
topology of six agents system are illustrated in Figs. 2.1(a) and 2.1(b), respectively.
Let the adjacency relationship of agent xi with its neighbors be encoded by the
symmetric N ⇥ N adjacency matrixA(G) = [ai j] 2 RN⇥N , where for the undirected
graph topology
ai j :=
8>>>><>>>>: 1 if x j 2 Ni0 otherwise. (2.5)
The degree matrixD(G) 2 RN⇥N containing the vertex degree ofG on the diagonal,
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(a) Undirected graph (b) Directed graph
Figure 2.1: Examples of graph topology for six agents.
is denoted byD(G) = diag{d1, . . . , dN} = diag(A(G)1), where




Then, L(G) is the Laplacian matrix associated with G where it satisfies
L(G) := D(G)  A(G)   0. (2.7)
The real eigenvalues of (2.7) can be sorted to satisfy
0 =  1(G)   2(G)  · · ·   N(G).
The following lemma addresses the connectivity of a given graph G:
Lemma 2.2.1. Suppose  2(G) > 0, then G is a connected graph.
Proof. See Theorem 2.8 in [34] for complete proof. ⇤
Besides, given a weighted graph G, we can also define its Laplacian L(G) :=





Wi j if j = i
 Wij if j , i.
(2.8)
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Definition 2.2.2. For a graphG, if there always exists path from vi to v j, 8 (i, j) 2 V,
then G is a strongly connected graph.
Definition 2.2.3. A graph G is said to be balanced if degiin = degiout, where degiin is
the number of incoming links into the node vi, and degiout is the number of outgoing
link from the node vi, 8i.
2.3 Important definitions in Stable Marriage Prob-
lem
In this section, we restate the definitions adopted from [33], and they are asserted
here for clarity.
Definition 2.3.1 (Preferred partner). Suppose the persons x and y are in z’s prefer-
ence list and of the opposite sex, then if and only if x proceeds y in z’s list, we say
z prefers x than y. We also denote this condition as x  z y.
Definition 2.3.2 (Matching). Suppose M is the matching set for a one-to-one cor-
respondence pairing between the men and women sets. For a man m to be called
partner to a woman w, then {m, w} 2 M. We also denote m = pM(w), w = pM(m) to
imply pM(w) and pM(w) as the M-partners of m and w, respectively.
Definition 2.3.3 (Blocking Pairs). Given two pairs {mx, wy}, {my, wy} 2 M such that
mx = pM(wx) and my = pM(wy). Suppose that based on the preference lists of mx
and wy, we have wy  mx wy and mx  wy my, then we say that the pair mxwy constitute
the blocking pairs of M, such that mxwy 2 BP.
Definition 2.3.4 (Stability in SMP). A matching M where BP , ; is called unsta-
ble, and is otherwise stable.
Definition 2.3.5 (Stable Pair). Form = pM(w), where {m, w} 2 M such that BP = ;,
then m and w constitute a stable pair in M.
11
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2.4 Stability theory
An autonomous system can be represented by the first order di↵erential equation of
x˙(t) = f (x(t)) (2.9)
where f : D! Rn is a locally Lipschitz function and mapped from domain D ⇢ Rn
into Rn. The system (2.9) is said to be continuous and smooth, since the right hand
side is continuous.
On the other hand, to denote the di↵erential equation of discontinuous-right-
hand side, it can be represented by a di↵erential inclusion
x˙(t) 2a.e. K{ f (x, t)} (2.10)
where K{ f (x, t)} is the Filippov’s di↵erential inclusion. The abbreviation a.e. stands
for “almost everywhere”.
Definition 2.4.1 (Filippov solution [35, 36]). A vector function x(·) is a solution of
(2.10) on [t0, t1] if
• x(·) is absolutely continuous on [t0, t1], and
• for almost all t 2 [t0, t1]
x˙(t) 2 K{ f (x, t)}. (2.11)
with




co f (B(x,  )   D, t) (2.12)
where co means the closed convex hull; B(x,  ) is a closed   neighborhood of
x; D is an arbitrary set in Rn; µ is n-dimensional Lebesgue measure; \µ(N)=0
12
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means the intersection over all sets D of Lebesgue measure zero.
Definition 2.4.2 (Stability of the equilibrium point[37, 38]). Let x0 2 D be the
equilibrium points of either (2.9) or (2.10). Then, the equilibrium point x = x0 is
(i) stable if, for each ✏ > 0 2 R, there exists   =  (✏) > 0 to satisfy
kx(0)k <   ) kx(t)k < ✏, 8 t   0,
(ii) asymptotically stable, if condition (i) is satisfied, and there exists   2 R such
that
kx(0)k <   ) lim
t!1 x(t) = x0.
2.4.1 Lyapunov stability
The stability of a given dynamical system can be analyzed by checking the stability
of the solutions of its di↵erential equation near to a point of equilibrium. Hence,
by ensuring that the stability conditions are satisfied, then we can conclude about
the behavior of those system at this point. The general description of the stability is
given in Def. 2.4.2. However, the following lemmas provide us with essential tools
in analyzing the stability of the dynamical system near its equilibrium points.
Lemma 2.4.1 (Lyapunov’s second method for stability). Assume that the system
(2.9) has an equilibrium point at x = x0. Then, the system is asymptotically stable,
if and only if there exist a Lyapunov function V(x) : Rn ! R satisfying
• V(x) > 0 for all x , x0,
• V˙(x) < 0 for all x , x0, and
• V(x0) = V˙(x0) = 0.
13
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Suppose the right-hand-side of (2.9) is non-smooth (i.e., equation (2.10)), then
the following lemma provides the generalized form of Lemma 2.4.1 to discuss the
stability of the non-smooth dynamic.
Lemma 2.4.2 (Generalized Lyapunov Theorem). Given that (2.10) is discontinuous
on the right-hand-side, and has an equilibrium point x = x0. Then, if there exists
• a V : Rn ! R,V(x0) = 0,V(x) > 0,8x , x0, such that V(x(t)) is absolutely
continuous on [t,1), and
• d
dt
[V(x(t))] <  ✏ < 0 a.e. on {t | x(t) , x0},
then x converge to x0 in finite time. Thus, the system (2.10) is generally asymptoti-
cally stable in the sense of Lyapunov.
Proof. See Theorem 2 in [36] for the complete proof. ⇤
2.4.2 Stability in matching theory
The stability of a given matching is analyzed by identifying the existence of the
blocking pairs. For any given matching, it is said unstable if there exist blocking
pairs, and otherwise stable. To clearly comprehend this concept, let’s consider two
examples of three pairs SMP problem given in Table A.2 of Appendix A .
Example 2.4.1. Let M1 = {m1w1, m2w2, m3w3} is said to be the matching pairs
for men and women based on the preference list in Table A.2. First, consider the
pair m1w1 2 M1. Here, we can see that m1 prefers w2 than his current partner, w1.
Similarly, w2 also prefers m1 than her current partner, m2. Hence, m1w2 2 BP forms
the first blocking pair in M1. Next, for the pair m2w2 2 M1, there is no blocking
pair associated with it. However, for the pair m3w3 2 M1, we can see that m3 prefers
w2 than this current partner w3, and w2 prefers m3 than her current partner m2. So,
we deduce m3w2 2 BP . Therefore, since there exist blocking pairs in M1 where
BP = {m1w2, m3w2}, then M1 is an unstable matching.
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Example 2.4.2. Let M2 = {m1w1, m2w3, m3w2} is said to be the new set of matching
pairs. For this matching, it can be observed that there is no blocking pair exists in
the solution. Hence, since BP = ;, then M2 is a stable matching.
2.5 Summary
The mathematical preliminaries to be used throughout the dissertation have been
presented. We also compared the definitions of stability in both Lyapunov and
matching theories. In the Lyapunov stability theory, a dynamical system is said
stable if it satisfies the trajectory conditions of the Lyapunov functions. Meanwhile
in the matching theory, a stable matching is defined as the matching without the
blocking pairs.
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In Section 3.1, we revisit the algorithm proposed by Gale & Shapley[7] to attain
stable matching for a given bipartite sets of men and women. Then in Section 3.2,
we introduce the dynamic of MAS to represent the individual of man and woman,
and our problem formulation. Next, we introduce the new definition of Dynami-
cal Stable Matching in Section 3.3 . We discuss the formulation of the Lyapunov
function based on the preference lists in Section 3.4. The chapter is summarized in
Section 3.5
3.1 Gale and Shapley algorithm
The terminology of SMP in the matching theory was first coined in year 1962 in the
seminal work of Gale and Shapley[7]. The original optimization problem involved
on finding the most stable partners for a given sets of men and women such that the
established partnerships do not constitute any blocking pairs. Refer Defs. 2.3.3 and
2.3.4 on the description of blocking pair and stability in terms of SMP framework.
We assume that there exists bipartite sets ofM := {m1, m2, . . . ,mP} andW :=
{w1, w2, . . . , wP}, whereM andW stand for the men and women sets, respectively.
Meanwhile, P is the number of pairs. Each of the individuals in these two sets rank
orderly their preferred partners in the preference lists. We denote m as the current
17
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man to propose to the woman w in his list. If the proposed woman w is already
engaged, then m¯ is to denote her current partner. On the hand, we use w¯ as the
next-woman to be proposed from of the m’s preference list. The procedure of the
G-S algorithm [7] is presented in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Gale & Shapley Algorithm (Men-proposer)
1: procedure StableMatching(m, w)
2: Initialization: set all men and women to be free
3: while 9 free m do
4: assign w = m’s not-yet-proposed woman of the highest rank
5: if w is free then
6: m = pM(w) & w = pM(m)
7: (m, w)! M . m, w become partner
8: else if w is already engaged with m¯ then
9: if m precedes m¯ in w’s preference list then
10: w = pM(m)
11: (m, w)! M . w choose new partner
12: m¯ becomes free
13: else
14: w = pM(m¯) remain engaged
15: (m¯, w)! M . (m¯, w) remain partner




20: Final matching is established.
21: end procedure
This algorithm is guaranteed to terminate at O(P log P) iterations[13], and upon
termination, stable pairs M will be established. The stable pairs established in M
is said to be Men-Optimal, Women-Pessimal which favors men over women, since
men are the proposer and women are the receiver. The results will be the opposite
such that to favors women over men, if women is the first party to give the proposal
[7, 33].
Notice that G-S algorithm utilizes the sequential steps of optimizing in seeking
for the stable pairs between the bipartite sets. In the following chapters, we attempt
to address the same optimization problem as before, but utilize the multi-agent sys-
tem to achieve the objective.
18
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3.2 Agents dynamics
We consider MAS consists of N number of agents that move on n-dimensional
Euclidean space. Each of the agents is described by a single integrator as
x˙i = ui, (3.1)
where xi 2 Rn and ui 2 Rn are the position vector and (velocity) control input to be
designed, respectively. To represent the dynamic of the total system, we express the














respectively. Therefore, we may further rewrite the total system dynamic in the
form of
x˙ = u. (3.3)
By taking the average positions of all agents, the group’s center of formation







On the other hand, it is also assumed that the desired state trajectory xd 2 Rn for the
group center xc can be achieved by ud 2 Rn, that is
x˙d = ud. (3.5)
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3.3 Dynamical Stable Marriage Problem
The terminology of the dynamical SMP is being introduced in this section. For a
dynamical SMP, the ultimate goal is to find the optimum stable matching between
the bipartite sets by using the dynamic of the multi-agent systems.
A group of agents I = {1, 2, . . . ,N}, and their corresponding positions X =
{x1, x2 . . . , xN}, where xi defined in (3.1) is considered. We assume that I =M[W
and M \W = ;. Furthermore, we assume that P satisfies N = 2P. In addition,
let the odd numbering agents belong to the men set and the even numbering agents
belong to the women set, respectively. That is,
i 2M $ i 2 IM := {1, 3, . . . ,N   1}
i 2W $ i 2 IW := {2, 4, . . . ,N}.
(3.6)
The following definition provides the physical interpretation of the dynamical stable
matching.
Definition 3.3.1 (Dynamical Stable Matching). For the agent xi, we define an index
set denoting opposite gender and same gender as follows.
Ji =
8>>>><>>>>: IW if i 2MIM if i 2W, (3.7)
Ki =
8>>>><>>>>: IM if i 2MIW if i 2W. (3.8)
The agents i 2 I are said to dynamically achieve stable matching if
(a) for the stable partner j⇤ 2 Ji of i, (i.e., j⇤ := pM(i) 7! (i, j⇤) 2 M), then
limt!1 kx j⇤(t)   xi(t)k = 0.
(b) for k 2 Ki, there exists time instant t0 > 0 such that for all t > t0, we attain
kxk(t)   xi(t)k   d.
20
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(c) the center trajectory xc satisfies lim
t!1 kxc(t)  xd(t)k = 0, for the desired trajectory
xd.
Example 3.3.1. Consider the preference lists of the 2 pairs problems given in Ta-
ble A.1. To use (3.6), we have the men and women sets clustered into
M := {m1,m2} = {x1, x3}, W := {w1, w2} = {x2, x4}, (3.9)
respectively. For each agent i, the corresponding sets of Ji and Ki are given as
x1 :
8>>>><>>>>: J1 = {x2, x4}K1 = {x3} (3.10)
x2 :
8>>>><>>>>: J2 = {x1, x3}K2 = {x4} (3.11)
x3 :
8>>>><>>>>: J3 = {x2, x4}K3 = {x1} (3.12)
x4 :
8>>>><>>>>: J4 = {x1, x3}K4 = {x2}. (3.13)
Suppose the final matching is obtained as {m1w1}, {m2w2} 2 M. Hence, to illustrate
Def. 3.3.1(a), we attain lim
t!1 kx1   x2k = 0 and limt!1 kx3   x2k = 0. Furthermore, to
illustrate Def. 3.3.1(b), we attain lim
t!1 kx1   x3k   d and limt!1 kx2   x4k   d.
To achieve the dynamical stable matching, we use the preference rank pi j and
the weighted degree wi j defined as follows:
Definition 3.3.2 (Preference Rank). The preference rank pi j 2 {1, 2, . . . ,N} of the
agent i towards j 2 Ji is defined as the order of the agent j in the i’s preference list
(i.e., pi j = 1 means most preferred, and pi j = 2 second most preferred). In addition,
for j 2 Ki, pi j := 0.
21
CHAPTER 3. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Definition 3.3.3 (Weighted Degree). The weighted degree wi j is defined by using




|Ji| (|Ji| + 1)
⇣|Ji|   pi j + 1⌘ if j 2 Ji
0 otherwise,
(3.14)
where |Ji| is the cardinality of Ji.
The following example illustrate the preference rank and weighted degree ma-
trix for a preference list provided in Appendix A.
Example 3.3.2. When we have a preference list in Table A.3, w1 (agent 2) is ranked
second in the m2’s (agent 3) preference list, thus p32 = pm2w1 = 2. Then, from
Table A.3, the preference rank matrix is
P = (pi j)12⇥12
=
26666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666664
0 4 0 5 0 1 0 6 0 3 0 2
4 0 1 0 2 0 5 0 3 0 6 0
0 2 0 1 0 5 0 6 0 3 0 4
6 0 3 0 4 0 2 0 5 0 1 0
0 3 0 1 0 2 0 6 0 5 0 4
6 0 1 0 3 0 2 0 4 0 5 0
0 1 0 3 0 2 0 4 0 5 0 6
3 0 6 0 5 0 2 0 1 0 4 0
0 6 0 3 0 4 0 1 0 5 0 2
2 0 4 0 5 0 6 0 3 0 1 0
0 1 0 4 0 6 0 3 0 5 0 2
6 0 3 0 1 0 2 0 5 0 4 0
37777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777775
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and the weighted degree matrix is





0 3 0 2 0 6 0 1 0 4 0 5
3 0 6 0 5 0 2 0 4 0 1 0
0 5 0 6 0 2 0 1 0 4 0 3
1 0 4 0 3 0 5 0 2 0 6 0
0 4 0 6 0 5 0 1 0 2 0 3
1 0 6 0 4 0 5 0 3 0 2 0
0 6 0 4 0 5 0 3 0 2 0 1
4 0 1 0 2 0 5 0 6 0 3 0
0 1 0 4 0 3 0 6 0 2 0 5
5 0 3 0 2 0 1 0 4 0 6 0
0 6 0 3 0 1 0 4 0 2 0 5
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3.4 Lyapunov function minimization
In designing the suitable control law for the dynamical stable matching, we utilize
all information available in the preference list. We design a Lyapunov function to
be minimized as
V(x) = VT (x) + Vc(x), (3.15)
where VT (x) > 0 : RnN ! R and Vc(x) > 0 : Rn ! R are defined to use a








wi jkx j   xik +
X
k2Ki




kxc   xdk2. (3.18)
The Lyapunov candidate VT is designed to take (a) and (b) in Def. 3.3.1 into




wi jkx j   xik
subject to kxk   xik   d, 8k 2 Ki, i = 1, 2, . . . ,N.
(3.19)
Meanwhile, the Lyapunov candidate Vc is designed as the energy dissipation func-
tion corresponding to the xc and xd to take (c) into consideration in Def. 3.3.1. The
weight wi j in (3.19) is defined in Def. 3.3.3.
Problem 3.4.1. For the dynamic of agent i in (3.1) and to use the weighted degree
(3.14) obtained from the preferences list of men and women, design the appropriate
control action ui such that the Lyapunov function (3.15) is minimized.
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3.5 Summary
In this chapter, we revisit the algorithm proposed by the Gale & Shapley[7] to attain
stable matching between the bipartite sets. We also introduced our definition of the
dynamical stable matching. We say that a stable matching is established when this
definition is satisfied.
25
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Chapter 4
Main Result 1 : Centralized Control
and Stability Analysis
In this chapter, we present our initial result to attain dynamical stable matching for
MAS with fixed network topology.
4.1 Proposed control law and stability of the total sys-
tem
The following theorem provide the suitable control law to attain dynamical stable
matching.
Theorem 4.1.1. (Fixed network stable matching theorem [39]) For a MAS with
fixed communication topology, starting from ⌦ = {x : V(x)   }, the dynamical
stable matching is achieved under the state feedback control








uci =   kc(xi   xd) + ud, (4.3)
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(aibi j + ajb ji)(x j   xi) (4.4)




(cik + cki)(xk   xi), (4.5)




wi j0kx j0   xik (4.6)
bi j =
wi j
kx j   xik (4.7)
cik = 2⌫ik
 
1   dkxk   xik
!
. (4.8)
Proof. We first prove Thm. 4.1.1 by investigating V(x) = VT (x)+Vc(x)   0, that the
VT (x) in (3.16) is nonnegative except for xi, x j, xk satisfying x j = xi, kxk   xik = d.
Obviously, Vc(x)   0 and Vc(x) = 0 when xc = xd. Clearly, V(x) satisfies the first
condition in Lem. 2.4.1.
Next, we show that V(x) satisfies the second condition in Lem. 2.4.1. From
(3.15), its time derivative is obtained as
V˙(x) = V˙T (x) + V˙c(x). (4.9)








bi j(x j   xi)T (uj   ui) +
X
k2Ki
cik(xk   xi)T (uk   ui). (4.10)
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Note that in (4.10), the terms bi j(x j   xi) and cik(xk   xi) requires us to apply
Lem. 2.1.1 to ensure continuity at the non-di↵erentiable points. This implies
bi j (x j   xi) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
wi j
x j   xi
kx j   xik if kx j   xik , 0
wi j g if kx j   xik = 0




1   dkxk   xik
!
(xk   xi) if kxk   xik , 0
2⌫ik (xk   xi   dg) if kxk   xik = 0
with subgradient g satisfying kgk  1. For simplicity, we can always choose the








(a1b1 j + ajb j1)(x j   x1) +
X
k2K1







(aNbN j + ajb jN)(x j   xN) +
X
k2KN




L = La + Lr, (4.12)
with La := (lai j)N⇥N and L





(aibi j0 + aj0bj0i) if j = i
 (aibi j + ajb ji) if j , i, j 2 Ji
0 otherwise,
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(cik0 + ck0i) if k = i
 (cik + cki) if k , i, k 2 Ki
0 otherwise,
we can rewrite (4.11) as
V˙T = uT (L ⌦ In) x. (4.13)
In addition,






To (4.13) and (4.14), we apply feedback control (4.1), (4.2) and (4.3) with the vector
form
u = uSM + uc, (4.15)
uSM =  (L ⌦ In)x, (4.16)
uc =  (IN ⌦ kc)(x   1N ⌦ xd) + 1N ⌦ ud, (4.17)
where kc = kcIn is the diagonal feedback gain matrix.
The equation (4.13) is rewritten as
V˙T = (uSM + uc)T (L ⌦ In) x = (uSM + uc)T ( uSM)
=   kuSMk2   (uc)TuSM. (4.18)
The second term in (4.18) can be expanded to give us
 (uc)TuSM =  (xT   1TN ⌦ xTd )(IN ⌦ kc)(L ⌦ In)x + (1TN ⌦ uTd )(L ⌦ In)x.
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Furthermore, we have
(IN ⌦ kc)(L ⌦ In) = (INL) ⌦ (kcIn) = L ⌦ kc,
and due to the matrix gains L is symmetric and have columns/rows sum equal to
zero, that is
(1TN ⌦ uTd )(L ⌦ In) = (1TNL) ⌦ (uTd In) = 0.
Then, we can show that
 (uc)TuSM = xT (L ⌦ kc)x + (1TN ⌦ xd)(L ⌦ kc)x =  kxk2L⌦kc + (1TNL) ⌦ (xTdkc)x
=   kxk2L⌦kc  0. (4.19)
In any case, it can be shown that by selecting appropriate constant ⌫i > 0 in (3.17),




uSMi = 1TnNuSM =  (1TN ⌦ 1Tn )(L ⌦ In)x =  (1TNL) ⌦ (1Tn In)x = 0,










i )   ud = 1N
NX
i=1




=   kc(xc   xd). (4.20)
By substituting (4.20) into (4.14), we reach to
V˙c =   kc(xc   xd)T (xc   xd) =  kckxc   xdk2  0. (4.21)
To sum up, combining results from (4.18) and (4.21), we show that V˙(x)  0.
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The above results clearly indicated that V(x) is monotonically non-increasing
for all t   0. Now, we make use the LaSalle’s invariance principle[37] to evaluate
the states’ trajectories when we apply (4.1). Suppose that E = {x 2 ⌦ | V˙ = 0} is
the largest invariant set. For all states starting in ⌦, converge to E when V˙ = 0,
uSM = 0, kxkL⌦kc = 0 and xc = xd. Therefore, all states asymptotically converge
to E = {x 2 ⌦ | xc = xd, x˙i = x˙c, kx j⇤   xik = 0}. That is to say, all agents’
speed asymptotically converge to the formation center’s speed while the formation’s
center converges to the desired trajectory. At this point, all agents i are matched with
his/her best partner such that {i = pM( j⇤), j⇤ = pM(i) | (i, j⇤)! M}. ⇤
4.2 Summary
In this chapter, we presented the control law to attain dynamical stable matching
when we use full information from the preference lists. We proved that the final
matching is stable since the total system is Lyapunov stable.
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Main Result 2: Decentralized
Control and Stability Analysis
In this chapter, we present our second result to attain dynamical stable matching
for MAS. As the communication between the agents is time-varying, the di↵eren-
tial equation of the total system is observed to be discontinuous at the right-hand-
side. Hence, to investigate its stability, we employ the methods adopted from Gu et
al.[40].
5.1 Modified control law
The proposed control law (4.2) to seek for stable matching for each agent i presented
in Section 4.1 utilizes full information of all agents. Due to the excess information,
the calculated control action tends to be very large (depicted in Fig. 5.1). To over-
come this problem, each agent i is limited to communicate only with its neighboring
agents. As all agents tend to follow the desired trajectory to achieve condition (c)
in Def. 3.3.1, there will be more agents within i’s sensing range, thus permitting for
wider selection of agents to be matched with.
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Definition 5.1.1 (Neighboring Agents). Let R be the distance sensing range of i.
The agent j is a neighbor of i if it belongs to the set
Ni =
n
j 2 I | ri j = kx j   xik  R
o
. (5.1)
Figure 5.1: Case 1 : Control signals due to centralized structure
Due to limited communication between agents, we propose the decentralized
control of the same form as (4.1) given by
ui = uSMiN + u
c
i (5.2)
and in the vector form as
u = uSMN + u
c (5.3)
where uSMN is denoted in (5.4) and u
c is given in (4.17). The control law uSMiN in
(5.2) is due to SMP and has the same form as (4.2), but with di↵erent control gains
depending on the communication topology. In the vector form, it is recurrently
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defined as
uSMN =  (LN ⌦ In)x (5.4)















j0i) if j = i










k0i) if k = i,
 (cNik + cNki ) if k , i, k 2 Ki \Ni
0 otherwise.
The variables aNi , b
N
i j and c
N
ik of each agent i take the form of equation (4.6) but only








kx j   xik
cNik = 2⌫ik
 





Due to the selection of control law (5.4), the total control dynamic (3.3) is comprised
of discontinuous right-hand-side function, hence it takes the di↵erential form of
(2.11). Based on Def. 2.4.1 and using (5.3) where f (x, t) = u = uSMN + u
c, the
di↵erential inclusion defined in (2.12) for the discontinuous di↵erential equation of
(2.11) can be calculated using the calculus presented in [36]. Therefore, the total
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dynamic is obtained as
x˙ 2 K{ f (x, t)} = K{u}








where 9 , {8i, 9 j 2 Ji \Ni, 9k 2 Ki \Ni}.
5.2.1 Nonsmooth stability analysis
In similar form to (3.15), we use a suitable candidate of the Lyapunov function for
the non-smooth system given by






and Vc(x) is defined in (3.18), respectively. However, slight modification in Vi is
needed so that Ji is divided into two groups: neighbor Ji \ Ni and not neighbor













⌫ik (d   kxk   xik)2 +
X
k2Ki\Ni
⌫ik (d   R)2   1
where Vi(·) 2 C0 corresponds to the local Lyapunov function of agent i.
Since the chosen Lyapunov function (5.7) is non-smooth, the notion of gradient
used in the continuous case is not suitable. Provided that the function is locally Lip-
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schitz, the nonsmooth stability of the total system can be analyzed by employing
the Clarke’s generalized gradient[41]. Here, for any point x, the generalized gra-
dient is treated as a set-valued map corresponds to gradient’s convex closure near
x. The following definitions are adopted from Gu et al. [40] which give the formal
descriptions of Clarke’s generalized gradient and set-valued derivative.
Definition 5.2.1 (Clarke’s generalized gradient). Suppose V : Rm ! R is a locally





rV(xt) | xt < ⌦v [ D
 
(5.9)
where D is an arbitrary set of zero measure, and ⌦v is the set of Lebesgue measure
zero such that the gradient rV is nonexistent.
Definition 5.2.2 (Set-valued derivative). The set-valued derivative of V is denoted
as
V˙(x) = {a = hq, ⌫i 2 R | 9⌫ 2 K{ f (x, t)},8q 2 @V(x)} . (5.10)
For the function V(x) which is di↵erentiable at x, the appropriate set-valued deriva-
tive is V˙ = {(rV(x))T⌫ | ⌫ 2 K{ f (x, t)}}.
Definition 5.2.3 (Weakly invariant set). The set ⌦m is the the weakly invariant set
of (2.11), if for each point x 2 ⌦m there exists a maximal solution of (2.11) in ⌦m.
Lemma 5.2.1 (Adopted from Lem. 2 in Gu et al. [40]). Suppose x is the solution
of (2.11). Suppose V is locally Lipshitz, continuous, and regular function. Then,
(d/dt)V(x) exists a.e., and (d/dt)V(x) 2 V˙(x) a.e.
The following theorem is proposed to achieve dynamical stable matching be-
tween agents with time-varying communication topologoy.
Theorem 5.2.1. (Time-varying network stable matching theorem [42]) For time-
varying network agents, starting from ⌦ = {x : V(x)   }, then employing the
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feedback control of ui (5.2) with appropriate gain kc ensures the dynamical stable
matching between agents to be generally asymptotically stable.
Proof. In (5.7), it is trivial that VT (x) and Vc(x) are positive definite functions. Thus,
it can be deduced that first condition of Lem. 2.4.2 is satisfied due to the fact that
V(x) in (5.7) is positive definite.
Next, we show that the generalized gradient of the selected Lyapunov function
(5.7) will satisfy the second condition in Lem. 2.4.2. By employing Lem. 5.2.1, if
x be a solution of of di↵erential inclusion (5.6), and V(x) defined in (5.7) is locally
Lipschitz, continuous, and regular function. It yielded that (d/dt)V(x) exists a.e.,
and (d/dt)V(x) 2 V˙(x) a.e.
The generalized gradient of V(x) in (5.7) is derived as
@V(x) = @VT (x) + @Vc(x). (5.11)








bNi j (x j   xi) +
P
k2Ki\Ni
cik(xk   xi) otherwise.
(5.12)
Similarly, we apply Lem. 2.1.1 to bNi j (x j   xi) and cNik (xk   xi) in (5.12) to imply
bNi j (x j   xi) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
wi j
x j   xi
kx j   xik if kx j   xik , 0
wi j g if kx j   xik = 0




1   dkxk   xik
!
(xk   xi) if kxk   xik , 0
2⌫ik (xk   xi   dg) if kxk   xik = 0
where kgk  1. The calculated set-valued derivative for the di↵erential inclusion
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ki )(xk   xi)T x˙i
=  (uSMN )T (uSMN + uc)
=  kuSMN k2   kxk2LN⌦kc
(5.13)
where ⇠i 2 @Vi(x). Likewise to the centralized control, the generalized gradient of
the second component in (5.11) can be obtained by re-using (4.20) and (4.14). Thus
we reach to
@Vc(x)= V˙c(x, t) =  kxc   xdk2kc  0. (5.14)
Combining (5.13) and (5.14), we obtain the set-valued derivative for the gener-
alized gradient of (5.11) given by
V˙(x) =  kuSMN k2   kxk2LN⌦kc   kxc   xdk2kc (5.15)
Now, we utilize the generalized version of LaSalle’s invariance principle (see
Thm. 3 in [38]) to evaluate the states’ trajectories of the non-smooth system. Let
XV =
⇢
x 2 RnN | 0 2 V˙(x)
 
. (5.16)
The largest weakly invariant subset of XV is {kuSMN k2 = 0, kxk2LN⌦kc = 0, kxc xdk2kc =
0}. Therefore, starting in ⌦, the Filippov’s trajectories of the states converge to the
largest weakly invariant set E = {x 2 ⌦ | xc = xd, x˙i = x˙c, kx j⇤   xik = 0}. All
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agents are matched with their best partners which yield to stable matching i.e., {i =
pM( j⇤), j⇤ = pM(i) | (i, j⇤)! M}. ⇤
5.3 Summary
In this chapter, we proposed the decentralized control law to achieve dynamical
stable matching by MAS. Since the communication topology between the agents is
time-varying, the total dynamical system was formed by di↵erential equation of dis-
continuous right-hand-side. Utilizing the stability analysis tools for a discontinuous




This chapter presents the simulation results to numerically illustrate our findings.
The results are presented as follows. In Sect. 6.1, we focus on the centralized con-
trol. Then in Sect. 6.2 we illustrate the results when we use the decentralized con-
trol. Finally, we compare the matching M, obtained by these two cases with the one
obtained using the G-S algorithm.
We consider a MAS consists of 12 agents (which constitute 6 stable pairs)
in such they can be segregated into men and women’s sets. We denote the odd-
numbering agents as belonging to the men set and the even-numbering agents are
assigned to the opposite gender. Each of these agents ranks orderly their preferred
partners as listed in Table A.3. We assume that the individual agent has the knowl-
edge on the preference list of the other agents. We consider the movement of agents
in the Euclidean space such that n = 2.
6.1 Case 1: Centralized control
The positions of all agents at t = 0 were randomly initialized within [ 20m, 20m]
in both x-y coordinates. The desired trajectory dynamic was chosen as straight line
given by xd(t) = [5t, 0]T . Meanwhile, the desired distance separation between
stable pairs was set as d = 5m. The state feedback control gain and the multiplier
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constant were chosen as kc = 2 and ⌫i = 10, respectively. We first investigate the
overall system’s behavior due to the centralized control law (4.1).
Figures 6.2 and 6.3 show the agents’ trajectories and their final positions, respec-
tively. It can be seen that formation center converged to the desired trajectory which
yield to the final matching of M = {m1w5,m2w2,m3w3,m4w6,m5w1,m6w4} satisfying
all conditions in Def. 3.3.1. Since the control law (4.2) for each agent i due to stable
matching in (4.1) uses the information from all other agents, the calculated control
values tend to be large as embodied in Fig. 5.1. This yield to large global Lyapunov
cost at the initial time t = 0 and instantaneously decreased as t ! 1 as illustrated
in the first plot of Fig. 6.1. By the same token, when considering the energy dissipa-
tion function for the formation center’s trajectory tracking as in the second plot of
same figure, it can be seen that the energy was monotonically decreasing as t ! 1.
Figure 6.1: Case 1 : Lyapunov function response
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Figure 6.2: Case 1 : Agents trajectories in matching with their stable partners
Figure 6.3: Case 1 : Final positions of all agents (enlarged)
6.2 Case 2: Decentralized control
We tested the decentralized control law (5.2) to achieve the stable matching in
the multi-agent systems. We set all the parameters to be the same as specified in
Sect. 6.1. In contrast to the centralized control structure, each of the agents calcu-
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late its control action using the information available from agents that exists within
its sensing range. Here, we specified the sensing range of each agent i as R = 10m.
Figures 6.4 and 6.5 show the agent trajectories and their final positions when we
use the decentralized control law (5.2). As we compare the agents’ control ampli-
tudes shown in Fig. 6.6 with Case 1 (Fig. 5.1) from the previous section, clearly it
can be seen that Case 2 exhibits smaller magnitude of the control signals. The final
matching obtained by this control action is M = {m1w6, m2w1, m3w5, m4w4, m5w3,
m6w2}.
Next in Fig. 6.7, we presented the trajectory of the global Lyapunov function
(5.7) and the cost function due the formation tracking Vc. For ease of illustration,
the normalized scale is used in these plots. It can relatively be seen that the cost Vc
due to formation tracking is still monotonically decreasing despite the cost function
due to SMP is non-smooth.
Figure 6.4: Case 2 : Agents trajectories in matching with their stable partners
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Figure 6.5: Case 2 : Final positions of all agents (enlarged)
Figure 6.6: Case 2 : Control signals due to decentralized structure
6.3 Blocking pairs
The matchingM obtained using Gale & Shapley algorithm (men-proposer) and both
Cases 1 & 2 along with their number of blocking pairs are summarized in Table. 6.1.
To say that for a given matching M to be stable in terms of matching theory, it
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Figure 6.7: Case 2 : Lyapunov function response
has to satisfy the condition given in Def. 2.3.4[7, 15]. Clearly, from Table 6.1 we
can see that Gale & Shapley algorithm ensures the non-existence of the blocking
pairs. Meanwhile, our proposed control laws yield us to the final matching with the
blocking pairs.
In our formulation, the final matching is said to be stable when he have the total
system to be dynamically stable and satisfies the conditions given in Def. 3.3.1.
Therefore, our results both Cases 1 and 2 suggested that the total system is stable
when we executed our proposed control laws, despite there exist blocking pairs.
Hence, we conclude that the attained final matching is a stable matching.
As depicted in Figs. 6.3 and 6.5, all agents are matched with their best partners
while maintaining the desired distance separation between the same gender agents
as they move towards the desired trajectory points. Even though the number of
blocking pairs obtained by Case 2 relatively higher than Case 1, Case 2 is better o↵
than Case 1 due to lower magnitude of the computed control signal to achieve the
stable matching between the agents.
46
CHAPTER 6. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
Table 6.1: Final Matching and Blocking Pairs
Matching,M G-S algo Case 1 Case 2
Proposer Matched Partner pM(mi)
m1 w5 w5 w6
m2 w2 w2 w1
m3 w3 w3 w5
m4 w1 w6 w4
m5 w4 w1 w3
m6 w6 w4 w2
Number of none 4 6
Blocking Pairs
6.4 Summary
In this chapter, we presented the numerical simulations to illustrate the e↵ectiveness
of our proposed control laws. It can be seen that the final matching attained by
both controllers did not yield to stable matching without the blocking pairs that
satisfy Def. 2.3.4. However, since we introduced the new definition of stability for
a dynamical system as in Def. 3.3.1, and the total systems were also stable according
to the Lyapunov stability theory. Therefore, we may conclude that the attained final
matchings when the proposed control laws were employed, are all stable matchings.
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This dissertation is concerned on solving the combinatorial optimization of the sta-
ble marriage problem in finding the stable partnership of the bipartite sets, i.e., men
and women. The original approach of solving the matching theory is to attain
matching without the blocking pairs. Various methods have been proposed by re-
searchers to address matching, ranging from the utilization of discrete optimization,
biologically-inspired algorithms to consideration of dynamical system.
The implementation of the SMP in the real-world applications is promising.
It has been proven and identified that this theory not only attract interest among
economist, but also from other disciplines.
In this dissertation, we investigated the potential of solving SMP by the dy-
namical approach. Motivated by the Gale and Shapley algorithm, we proposed the
utilization of the MAS to dynamically attain stable matching. We proposed two
control laws that were designed based on the minimization of the specified Lya-
punov functions. By defining a new definition of stability for a dynamical systems,
we proved that our proposed control algorithm can yield us to a stable total MAS
that corresponds to the stable matching.
49
CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION
7.2 Recommendation for future work
It is our intention to attain final matching such that the stability of the total system
corresponds to the matching without the blocking pairs. Hence, there exists more
room for improvement in deriving the suitable control laws such that the global
Lyapunov function incorporating this phenomenon. As avoiding the blocking pairs
is essence of stability analysis in the original SMP theory, it has been omitted in this
study due to the nonexistence of such cost function. By taking blocking pairs into
account, it is expected that the derived control law can guarantee asymptotic conver-
gence of the agents’ trajectories such that their final matching shall satisfy both the
Lyapunov stability and SMP theories. Hence, it warrants for future investigation.
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Gale & Shapley Algorithm:
Examples
In this section, we provide three examples of preference lists for men and women.
Three di↵erent problem pairs are being considered, and the step-by-step iteration in
finding the stable partnerships based on the Gale & Shaply algorithm presented in
Algorithm 1 will be established. In these examples, we assume the men set as the
proposer, and the women set as the receiver. Therefore, it is expected that men will
get their best partner which is ranked higher in their preference list[15].
Some additional notations to be observed. For any y, we indicate the ranking
preference in its list using  y . When we have x  y z, it means y prefers x to z. To
indicate pairing between x and y, we use y = pM(x). It means x is matched to y.
Note that the same examples in Tables A.2 and A.3 have also been used for our
case studies in [39] and [42], respectively.
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A.1 Example 1 : 2 pairs problem









Algorithm 2 Running iteration for 2 pairs SMP (Men-Proposer)
1: procedure StableMatching(m, w)
2: Initialize all men and women to be free
3: First Round
4: m1 proposes to w2 . w2 accepts m1’s proposal 7! w2 = pM(m1)
5: m2 proposes to w2 . m1  w2 m2 : w2 rejects m2 7! w2 = pM(m1)
6: . m2 remains single
7: Second Round
8: m2 proposes to w1 . w1 accepts m2’s proposal 7! w1 = pM(m2)
9:
10: Matching stops as all men are matched.
11: end procedure
The final matching based on the G-S algorithm for men-proposer is obtained as
M = {m1w2, m2w1}.
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A.2 Example 2 : 3 pairs problem
Table A.2: Example of Men and Women Preference Lists for 3 pairs SMP
Men’s List
1st 2nd 3rd
m1 w2 w1 w3
m2 w1 w3 w2
m3 w1 w2 w3
Women’s List
1st 2nd 3rd
w1 m1 m3 m2
w2 m3 m1 m2
w3 m1 m3 m2
Algorithm 3 Running iteration for 3 pairs SMP
1: procedure StableMatching(m, w)
2: Initialize all men and women to be free
3: First Round
4: m1 proposes to w2 . w2 accepts m1’s proposal 7! w2 = pM(m1)
5: m2 proposes to w1 . w1 accepts m2’s proposal 7! w1 = pM(m2)
6: m3 proposes to w1 . m2  w1 m3 : w1 rejects m3 7! w1 = pM(m2)
7: . m3 remains single
8: Second Round
9: m3 proposes to w2 . m3  w2 m2 : w2 rejects m1 7! w2 = pM(m3)
10: . m1 becomes single
11: Third Round
12: m1 proposes to w1 . m1  w1 m2 : w1 rejects m2 7! w1 = pM(m1)
13: . m2 becomes single
14: Fourth Round
15: m2 proposes to w3 . w3 accepts m2’s proposal 7! w3 = pM(m2)
16:
17: Matching stops as all men are matched.
18: end procedure
The final matching based on the G-S algorithm for men-proposer is obtained as
M = {m1w1, m2w3, m3w2}.
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A.3 Example 3 : 6 pairs problem
Table A.3: Example of Men and Women Preference Lists for 6 pairs SMP
Men’s List
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th
m1 w3 w6 w5 w1 w2 w4
m2 w2 w1 w5 w6 w3 w4
m3 w2 w3 w1 w6 w5 w4
m4 w1 w3 w2 w4 w5 w6
m5 w4 w6 w2 w3 w5 w1
m6 w1 w6 w4 w2 w5 w3
Women’s List
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th
w1 m2 m3 m5 m1 m4 m6
w2 m6 m4 m2 m3 m5 m1
w3 m2 m4 m3 m5 m6 m1
w4 m5 m4 m1 m6 m3 m2
w5 m6 m1 m5 m2 m3 m4
w6 m3 m4 m2 m6 m5 m1
Algorithm 4 Running iteration for 6 pairs SMP
1: procedure StableMatching(m, w)
2: Initialize all men and women to be free
3: First Round
4: m1 proposes to w3 . w3 accepts m1’s proposal 7! w3 = pM(m1)
5: m2 proposes to w2 . w3 accepts m1’s proposal 7! w2 = pM(m2)
6: m3 proposes to w2 . m2  w2 m3 : w2 rejects m3 7! w2 = pM(m2)
7: . m3 remains single
8: m4 proposes to w1 . w1 accepts m4’s proposal 7! w1 = pM(m4)
9: m5 proposes to w4 . w4 accepts m5’s proposal 7! w4 = pM(m5)
10: m6 proposes to w1 . m4  w1 m6 : w1 rejects m6 7! w1 = pM(m4)
11: . m6 remains single
12: Second Round
13: m3 proposes to w3 . m3  w3 m1 : w3 rejects m1 7! w3 = pM(m3)
14: . m1 becomes single
15: m6 proposes to w6 . w6 accepts m6’s proposal 7! w6 = pM(m6)
16: Third Round
17: m1 proposes to w6 . m6  w6 m1 : w6 rejects m1 7! w6 = pM(m6)
18: . m1 remains single
19: Fourth Round
20: m1 proposes to w5 . w5 accepts m1’s proposal 7! w5 = pM(m1)
21:
22: Matching stops as all men are matched.
23: end procedure
The final matching based on the G-S algorithm for men-proposer is obtained as
M = {m1w5, m2w2, m3w3, m4w1, m5w4, m6w6}.
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